Soldiers from the tenth Mountain Division stand safety at Hamid Karzai International Airport, Kabul on August 15. (Marine Sgt. Isaiah Campbell)
The terrorist assault that killed almost 3,000 Americans and set the US on a course for warfare in Afghanistan additionally prompted a proper fee to deeply look at how the US authorities allowed the assault to occur. Twenty years later, retired Brig. Gen. James Scott O’Meara argues on this op-ed {that a} related fee is essential to look at the warfare itself, and America’s failures in it, so historical past doesn’t repeat itself.
In the wake of the autumn of Afghanistan to the Taliban, many laborious questions stay not nearly America’s final two weeks within the Southeast Asian nation, however its conduct for 20 years there. For the US to not be taught, to not actively hunt down priceless classes that if utilized correctly sooner or later would probably save lives and keep away from tragic outcomes, can be calamitous.
For that motive, Congress ought to set up a fee for Afghanistan, on the mannequin of the 9/11 Commission, to investigate choices and to kind beneficial adjustments that may probably stop a repeat of historical past.
This effort ought to embody analyzing choices made during the last 20 years from coverage right down to tactical stage planning and execution. This should not solely deal with the Department of Defense. Interagency and army choices, plans, execution all must be examined to evaluate classes that might profit future complete of presidency endeavors.
Emphasis ought to deal with coverage growth, interagency decision-making processes, and the way these choices have been carried out, to incorporate measuring progress. Importantly, this fee shouldn't be staffed with members who characterize political agendas or events. Domestic politics has no place right here.
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America has forgotten its classes earlier than. The pictures of Vietnam period helicopters ferrying personnel in and round Kabul introduced again pictures from 1975 because the United States then evacuated Americans and Vietnamese from the capital of South Vietnam.
Sadly, by the mid-Nineteen Eighties classes from that warfare had already light away. Military doctrine was rewritten emphasizing a shift again to “conventional” warfare with deal with the us. Lessons discovered from Vietnam have been archived. Promising organizational and operational approaches, such because the Office of Civil Operations and Rural Support (CORDS), Combined Action Program, Phoenix Program, and Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine had been eliminated for army doctrinal publications.
During early operations in each Iraq and Afghanistan, as soon as coverage makers expanded mission aims to incorporate nation constructing, safety power help; and many others., supporting initiatives as forming Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), designing operations knowledgeable by COIN doctrine aimed toward offering native safety with out alienating the native inhabitants, direct motion raids towards high-value-targets all confronted steep studying curves. Beyond the Department of Defense, interagency preparedness and coordination confronted nicely doc challenges and bureaucratic infighting. Sadly, the U.S. was not ready to transition battlefield successes into viable political options that might foster lasting stability.
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So now, daylight should be shined on resolution making pitfalls, strategic miscalculation, and, most significantly, on these choices that had important penalties. The listing of questions is lengthy.
What was the U.S. world technique? Regional technique? Were they frequently assessed? How was Pakistan factored? Engagement with regional nations? When the Taliban refused at hand over Osama bin Laden and choices have been made to takedown the Taliban, what have been the assumptions, identified information, concerns contemplated earlier than deciding to conduct what now grew to become a regime change mission?
Was there a transition plan as soon as the Taliban was eliminated? If not, why not? When the selections have been made to transition the mission to making a democracy-based, central authorities what have been the assumptions that fed this coverage choices? How was the choice made? What in regards to the sources, time, and dangers in coaching native police and army forces?
The interagency planning course of and its capacity to implement coverage actions in a unified, balanced method wants complete overview. The phrase “whole of government” is a hole buzzword. Authorities and funds are siloed throughout the chief department. Congressional management has taken a backseat.
The US can't proceed to aim to deal with twenty first century challenges with an government department performing from a construction that was established instantly following the ending of World War II firstly of the Cold War with solely marginal adjustments since.
Focusing on the choice course of, on why and the way essential choices have been made, could present present and future leaders with priceless insights, that, if utilized correctly, repeating historical past could also be prevented. Intensified feelings, partisan politics and posturing, bureaucratic inflexibility and “face saving” should not be allowed to contaminate discovery, studying, reporting, and alter implementation processes. Placing the report on the shelf can be a grand failure for each government and congressional management.
It is crucial that classes from the final twenty years be collected, studied, and used to implement wanted adjustments. The greater objective being to grasp and be taught from the quite a few coverage and army technique choices reaching again to 2002. Leveraging beforehand research, such because the reviews printed by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, together with quite a few research inspecting Iraq ought to kind the start line.
This is just not a few “witch hunt” or “blame game.” This is all about studying and stopping the repeat of historical past. It’s about future generations.
Brig. Gen. J. Scott O’Meara retired in 2018 following almost 36 years with the U.S. Marine Corps. His fight assignments embody Desert Shield and Desert Storm, three Iraqi Freedom excursions, together with Inherent Resolve for which he served because the Chief of Staff. He is at present a senior fellow on the American College of National Security Leaders.
